Collisional effects on the collective laser cooling of trapped bosonic gases

We analyse the effects of atom-atom collisions on collective laser cooling scheme. We derive a quantum Master equation which describes the laser cooling in presence of atom-atom collisions in the weak-condensation regime. Using such equation, we perform Monte Carlo simulations of the population dynamics in one and three dimensions. We observe that the ground-state laser-induced condensation is maintained in the presence of collisions. Laser cooling causes a transition from a Bose-Einstein distribution describing collisionally induced equilibrium,to a distribution with an effective zero temperature. We analyse also the effects of atom-atom collisions on the cooling into an excited state of the trap.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figure

The Anyon Hubbard Model in One-Dimensional Optical Lattices

Raman-assisted hopping may be used to realize the anyon Hubbard model in one-dimensional optical lattices. We propose a feasible scenario that significantly improves the proposal of [T. Keilmann et al., Nature Commun. 2, 361 (2011)], allowing as well for an exact realization of the two-body hard-core constraint, and for controllable effective interactions without the need of Feshbach resonances. We show that the combination of anyonic statistics and two-body hard-core constraint leads to a rich ground state physics, including Mott insulators with attractive interactions, pair superfluids, dimer phases, and multicritical points. Moreover, the anyonic statistics results in a novel two-component superfluid of holon and doublon dimers, characterized by a large but finite compressibility and a multipeaked momentum distribution, which may be easily revealed experimentally.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figure

Entanglement spectrum of one-dimensional extended Bose-Hubbard models

The entanglement spectrum provides crucial information about correlated quantum systems. We show that the study of the block-like nature of the reduced density matrix in number sectors and the partition dependence of the spectrum in finite systems leads to interesting unexpected insights, which we illustrate for the case of a 1D extended Hubbard model. We show that block symmetry provides an intuitive understanding of the spectral double degeneracy of the Haldane-insulator, revealing as well partial double degeneracy for the Mott-insulator. Moreover, surprisingly, the partition dependence of the spectral degeneracy in the Haldane- and Mott-insulator is directly linked to the, in principle unrelated, density-density correlations, and presents an intriguing periodic behavior in superfluid and supersolid phases.Comment: 4 pages, 8 figure

Labor Market Signaling with Overconfident Workers

I extend Spence's (1974) labor market signaling model by assuming some workers are overconfident and some underconfident. Overconfident (underconfident) workers underestimate (overestimate) their marginal cost of acquiring education. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and cannot observe workers' beliefs. However, firms know the fraction of overconfident, underconfident, and high-ability workers in the economy. I find that the presence of overconfident and/or underconfident workers in the labor market compresses wages. I show that workers' biased beliefs reduce welfare when workers are sufficiently different in terms of productivity and cost of education. Finally, I show that if the fraction of overconfident workers is relatively low and workers are sufficiently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education, then biased beliefs improve welfare.signaling; labor market; behavioral biases; wages; education

Collusion and Reciprocity in Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets

The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner’s (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games.

Reciprocity, Inequity Aversion, and Oligopolistic Competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

Positive Self-Image and Incentives in Organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.